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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a comprehensive operational definition of 
lawfare, analyze historical case studies of states currently implementing lawfare 
strategies, and to make an argument for why the U.S. should adopt a lawfare doctrine. 
Chapter 1 will focus on defining the concept of lawfare and drafting an operational 
definition of lawfare. Chapter 2 focuses on the evolution of the lawfare doctrine 
established by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), identifies the current lawfare 
operations conducted by the PRC in the fields of maritime, airspace, cyberspace, and 
outer space, and analyzing the implications of PRC lawfare operations for the U.S. 
Chapter 3 observes the use of lawfare by both Israel and Palestine, specifically focusing 
on Palestine’s use of lawfare to seek international recognition of statehood and the efforts 
of Israel to counter Palestinian lawfare operations through direct and indirect means. 
Chapter 4 illustrates the capacity of the U.S. to be a leader in the field of lawfare by 
identifying the current U.S. asymmetrical advantages that the U.S. has over other states in 
the international community. Chapter 5 concludes with a summary of the U.S. lawfare 
assets, an argument for why the U.S. should adopt a lawfare doctrine, and an outlined 
proposal of the resources needed for the U.S. lawfare doctrine, a mission statement for 
the lawfare doctrine, and a set of operational objectives that the U.S. lawfare doctrine 
should look to attain.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT OF LAWFARE 
 
As the world continues to progress ever closer towards being more quantifiable 
and regulated, states are likely to seek alternative vehicles to attain an asymmetrical 
advantage over their adversaries within the construct of an ever-changing international 
system. Lawfare is defined as one or more of the following characteristics: a form of 
asymmetric warfare using a legal system against an adversary; an instrument of state 
power; or a strategy that stipulates how a state should engage in international law and 
foreign relations. Presently, lawfare is being viewed a useful tool for both state and non-
state actors to achieve strategic goals that have traditionally solely been attainable 
through diplomatic or military means. Subsequently, countries like the U.S. are likely to 
be faced with the decision of whether to adopt an offensive lawfare strategy that advances 
their interests or a counteroffensive strategy that addresses the offensive lawfare 
strategies of adversarial states in the near future.  
Lawfare has been viewed by some states as an adjunct to traditional diplomacy; 
developing over time into an instrument of statecraft. The first evidence of a state 
considering the use of lawfare as a tool of diplomacy was the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), who adopted a lawfare doctrine; although referring to lawfare under the 
designation of “legal warfare.” The term lawfare was first used in a 1975 writing titled 
Whither Goeth the Law – Humanity or Barbarity, by authors John Carlson and Neville 
Yeomans, but was made popular after a 2001 speech by U.S. Major General Charles J. 
Dunlap Jr.1 In the 21st century, other states have considered and implemented lawfare 
                                                 
1 Christi Scott Bartman, Lawfare: Use of the Definition of Aggressive War by the Soviet and Russian 
Federation Governments. (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2010), 2. 
2 
strategies as an instrument of statecraft; reinforcing the value of lawfare as a useful tool 
that can be used by state and non-state actors.  
Within the field of international law, the scope, nature, and employment of 
lawfare have historically focused on the perspective of a state’s influence within the 
international system, the interests of that country, and for what purpose that state is 
seeking to achieve with the use of lawfare. In contemporary international politics, the 
concept of lawfare was illustrated through the diplomatic creation and signing of 
international laws and agreements. States seeking to enter these agreements were looking 
for a way to establish customary international law that would either preserve the existing 
rights of their state or otherwise benefit their state interests. To accomplish this, 
diplomatic officials would leverage the power and international influence of their state to 
achieve state objectives. An example of this contemporary method is observable in the 
Melian Dialogue between the Athenians and Melians. 
During the Peloponnesian War, Athenian historian Thucydides noted: “the strong 
do what they will while the weak suffer what they must.”2 Based on this model, lawfare 
was employed with a “might makes right” mentality, in which states with a sufficient 
level of international status could have a direct influence in the creation of international 
law. These agreements would often advance the interest of a state or coalition of states, 
sometimes at the detriment of other countries. The ability for states to leverage their 
global influence closely aligns with the Montevideo criterion: in which a state’s 
international personality is derived from its state identity, sovereignty, and legitimacy. 
                                                 
2 Thucydides, "History of the Peloponnesian War," The Melian Dialogue, 451 bc, accessed November 12, 
2016. https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/melian.htm. 
3 
The Montevideo criterion is the basis for a state being able to draft, sign, or 
engage in international politics within the scope of international law. The Montevideo 
criterion stipulates that a state must possess the following: a defined population, a defined 
territory, an established government, and capacity to enter relations with foreign 
countries.3 Though highly criticized, these four criteria create a working framework for 
drafting international laws. Subsequently, the Montevideo criterion served as the 
necessary requirements to conduct international law.  
Over time, the Montevideo criterion has been less efficient to hinder non-state 
actors and self-determination movements from impacting decisions in the field of 
international law. During the 20th and 21st Centuries, the international community 
experienced an unprecedented increase in the presence of non-state actors or non-
sovereign entities that possess significant influence at either the national or international 
level.4 This phenomenon is mainly attributable to the creation of international 
organizations, subsequent tribunal decisions by these international institutions, 
pronouncements by international law scholars, and changes in customary laws over time. 
To better understand the strengths, capabilities, and limitations of lawfare, a 
comprehensive operational definition of lawfare must be presented.  
 
  
                                                 
3 David J. Bederman, International law frameworks, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Foundation Press 
Thomson/West, 2006), 53. 
4 National Intelligence Council, "Nonstate Actors: Impact on International Relatoins and Implications for 
the United States," August 23, 2007, 2, accessed January 03, 2017, 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/nonstate_actors_2007.pdf. 
4 
Drafting an Operational Definition for Modern Lawfare 
Although the conceptual roots of lawfare can be traced back to foundational 
international customary practices between states, the definitions and uses of lawfare 
developed in the early 21st century denote a noticeable delineation from traditional 
diplomacy. Moreover, examples and case studies of lawfare used by state and non-state 
actors are more prevalent and identifiable in the 21st Century than at any point in history. 
In the modern context, two current operational definitions have been outlined that best 
represent the concept of lawfare.  
The first reference and discussion of lawfare as a viable instrument of statecraft to 
be used in future conflicts was brought up in Unrestricted Warfare, a book written by two 
officers of the People’s Liberations Army (PLA) of China. Written in 1999, Unrestricted 
Warfare discusses various strategies of how the PRC could take on and defeat a superior 
adversary in a theoretical future conflict.5 Included in this discourse were the concepts of 
using technology, economic warfare, network warfare, and legal means to counter an 
adversary’s strengths. The objective of implementing these lawfare strategies is to secure 
an asymmetrical advantage for the PRC over any potential adversary. Lawfare, or “legal 
warfare” as mentioned in Unrestricted Warfare, is defined as the use of international law, 
and other various means, to create a change in the strategic environment without the use 
of direct military action.6 Additional information and an examination of the strengths and 
weaknesses of Chinese lawfare can be found in Chapter 2. 
                                                 
5 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing 
House Arts, 1999), 19. 
6 Ibid. 
5 
The second definition of lawfare appeared in a position paper written by U.S. Air 
Force Major General Charles J. Dunlap Jr. In an article discussing the increasing utility of 
law in modern combat, Dunlap defined lawfare as “the strategy of using – or misusing – 
law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective.”7 
The position paper addressed the use of lawfare tactics by the Taliban and other terrorist 
groups, but also discussed the overall topic of lawfare. Although Dunlap’s definition of 
lawfare was published two years after Unrestricted Warfare was released, Dunlap is 
credited with coining the term lawfare and bringing the concept back into the forefront of 
international law and international relations.8 Information in addition to an opportunity 
analysis on U.S. lawfare can be located in Chapter 4. Although the two definitions 
attempt to illustrate the concept of lawfare, a more comprehensive operational definition 
is needed to aid in drafting a full lawfare doctrine.  
By incorporating aspects of both modern definitions of lawfare, a state seeking to 
develop a lawfare strategy that it can use as an instrument of state power. Lawfare is the 
strategy of using or creating international or domestic laws that result in a change in the 
strategic environment that is in the pursuit of a military or a political objective. This 
definition places emphasis on a state’s motivation for employing a lawfare strategy, 
observing that a state would not implement a lawfare campaign that did not advance its 
interests in some way. By viewing the entire field of lawfare through this definition, one 
can begin to observe and analyze the various motivations and intentions behind state 
actions within the arena of international law. Additionally, the new lawfare definition 
                                                 
7 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st 
Conflicts," Duke University Law, November 29, 2001, 4, accessed November 15, 2016, 
http://people.duke.edu/~pfeaver/dunlap.pdf. 
8 Ibid. 
6 
allows one to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of existing lawfare strategies and 
lawfare operations. Almost equally as important as determining what defines lawfare, a 
general understanding of the uses and potential power of lawfare must be outlined to gain 
a comprehensive framework for lawfare. 
 
Lawfare as an Instrument of Statecraft 
In the modern era, lawfare has become increasingly viewed as an effective 
instrument of state power that can be used to acquire an asymmetrical advantage within 
the international system.9 States can develop strategies or conduct operations to use 
lawfare in a given scenario. Although states consider lawfare with differing levels of 
interest, the states using lawfare value the ability of the tool to attain an asymmetrical 
advantage for the state over its potential adversaries. 
There are several reasons for why a state might find lawfare as an appealing 
alternative tool to kinetic action. For emerging military powers, lawfare can serve to 
complement a well-established or developing military capability. The advantage of 
implementing lawfare to supplement a military capability can be related to obtaining an 
asymmetrical advantage over an adversary in a conflict, or possibly hindering the 
operational capacity of an enemy during a battle. Examples of these lawfare strategies 
can be viewed when looking at the use of lawfare by both the Palestinian Authority and 
Israel during the Israel-Palestinian conflict (discussed in chapter 3). 
Another potential use for lawfare can be used to offset a deficit in military 
capability between a state and its adversary. Using lawfare in this manner can be 
                                                 
9 Orde F. Kittrie, Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), 1. 
7 
beneficial to countries seeking to address an opponent that is militarily more advanced, or 
to maintain a certain level of force protection if a state is making other reductions to its 
military forces. An example of the former can be found in looking at the uses and 
motivations of lawfare by the People’s Republic of China (Discussed in chapter 2). 
Alternatively, an example of the latter could be used in place for the US; however, the 
U.S. is currently not implementing lawfare as an instrument of statecraft (Discussed in 
chapter 4). 
Lawfare can also be an appealing alternative for those who dislike the cost of 
kinetic operations. When compared to developing, and maintaining a conventional force, 
lawfare is almost always financially cheaper.10 Additionally, using lawfare has rarely 
been the cause of loss of life.11 In an era of sequestration and attempting to pull away 
from an ongoing conflict, lawfare can be an effective solution for the U.S. to maintain its 
interests abroad with a shrinking federal budget. 
 
Lawfare Typology 
In the 21st Century, the majority of lawfare examples used has fallen into one of 
two broad categories: Instrumental lawfare and compliance-leverage disparity lawfare.12 
Instrumental lawfare is defined as “the use of legal tools to achieve the same of similar 
effects of legal instruments to achieve the same or similar effects as those traditionally 
sought from the conventional kinetic military action.”13 This type of lawfare comprises 
the majority of lawfare examples, as the scope of this lawfare type extends to any use of 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 8. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 1. 
13 Ibid. 11. 
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legal tools to achieve a strategic goal. Subsequently, this type of lawfare is limited only 
by the creativity of the states and individuals seeking to create a lawfare strategy. Most of 
the lawfare examples outlined in the following chapters will focus on the use of 
instrumental lawfare by state and non-state actors to achieve various objectives. Although 
the following chapters are focused on the use of instrumental lawfare, both types of 
lawfare have the capacity to be highly impactful and merits future research. 
Compliance-leverage disparity lawfare is defined as laws used to gain an 
advantage from the greater influence of law on or off a kinetic battlefield.14 An example 
of this type of lawfare can be observed in Dunlap’s lawfare essay, as the focus of the 
article is how the Taliban were using existing laws and the Law of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC) to avoid being targeted by U.S. military personnel.15 While the focus of that 
discussion centered on the Taliban, additional examples can be found with many other 
terrorist organizations around the world. 
 
Purpose 
The purpose of the subsequent chapters is to provide several case studies of states 
that have adopted or incorporated lawfare strategies, the strengths and weaknesses of 
those strategies, and a conclusion of future lawfare strategies from those states. Chapter 4 
will assess the capacity for the U.S. to implement lawfare strategies by analyzing 
examples of U.S. lawfare successes. Chapter 5 will conclude with a proposal for a U.S. 
                                                 
14 Ibid.  
15 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st 
Conflicts," Duke University Law, November 29, 2001, 1, accessed November 15, 2016, 
http://people.duke.edu/~pfeaver/dunlap.pdf. 
9 
lawfare doctrine: what it would look like, what the purpose of a U.S. lawfare strategy, 
and what the potential strengths and weaknesses of drafting a lawfare doctrine. 
 
Method 
To analyze the effectiveness of a lawfare strategy, one must understand the 
motivations the promulgated a state to implement a lawfare strategy, what the intended 
outcome of the lawfare strategy was seeking to accomplish, how the lawfare campaign 
was carried out, and what was the result of the lawfare operation. Each case study will 
begin with an analysis of official pronouncements and actions by the lawfare state. After 
assessing the motivations behind why a state would seek to conduct a lawfare operation, 
an analysis of the lawfare operation will demonstrate the thinking and rationale of the 
lawfare state. The effectiveness of a lawfare operation will be determined by the 
operations ability to cause a change in the lawfare state’s strategic environment and the 
response from the surrounding international community. By analyzing the steps taken 
during a specific lawfare campaign; one can understand a state's mentality for using 
lawfare in future conflicts. Each chapter will conclude with an analysis of the state’s 
lawfare apparatus, its effectiveness in employing lawfare strategies, and potential impacts 
from current lawfare operations being carried out by the lawfare state.  
 
End State 
Analyzing the results of a particular lawfare case study can determine the overall 
effectiveness of the lawfare concepts employed. The Subsequent chapters will examine 
the responses from adversarial belligerents to lawfare operations and assess the overall 
10 
efficiency of the lawfare strategies used. In doing so, general conclusions will be made on 
the efficiency of a state’s lawfare campaigns and how a country like the U.S. can learn 
from these campaigns when developing its lawfare doctrine.  
  
11 
CHAPTER 2: CHINA’S ADOPTION OF A LAWFARE DOCTRINE 
 
In the 21st century, the frequency and scope of lawfare used by the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) have increased at an almost unprecedented level. Moreover, the 
presence of a PRC lawfare doctrine sets China apart from other states that have also 
incorporated lawfare as a component of their overall diplomatic strategy. By observing 
the PRC’s use of lawfare in the fields of maritime, aviation, space, and cyberspace, one 
can gain a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the PRC lawfare 
strategy. These observations can provide states with vital information needed for a state 
to consider adopting an offensive or defensive lawfare strategy to counter the PRC’s 
aggressive lawfare campaigns. To gain a better understanding of how China views 
lawfare, one must understand the historical changes that have occurred both in Chinese 
society as a whole and how those changes impacted the Chinese rule of law.  
Much like the Communist revolution has changed and shaped the modern PRC, 
the country’s views on its legal apparatus and use of lawfare have also observed 
correlating changes over the past century. Under the direction of Communist Party 
Leader Mao Zedong, the PRC systematically dismantled its legal apparatus during the 
Cultural Revolution.16 From 1966 to 1976, the PRC systematically unraveled its legal 
system by disbanding its Ministry of Justice, closing all running domestic law education 
programs, and retraining all practicing lawyers to serve the communist party as farmers 
and laborers.17 In sum, all lawyers were no longer allowed to practice law, and the state 
                                                 
16 Orde F. Kittrie, Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), 163. 
17 Eric W. Orts, “The Rule of Law in China,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 34 (2001): 44. 
12 
prevented any additional Chinese nationals from becoming practicing lawyers. 
Effectively, the PRC had become a lawless state.  
The central reason for the PRC to suspend its legal apparatus was based on the 
ideology of the ruling Communist Party Chairman Mao Zedong. According to Chairman 
Mao, the rule of law in China was hindering the free flow of the revolution and therefore 
needed to be abolished.18 Before this abolition, the historical precedent for the use of law 
in the PRC was that law was viewed solely a tool for the government to exert 
authoritarian control over its people.19 Subsequently, the decision to upend its legal 
apparatus had less of an impact on daily life than a similar decision would have had in a 
more legally saturated state such as the US. 
After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the PRC began to reconstruct its legal 
apparatus and the basic rule of law quickly. By 2008, the PRC had developed a 
sophisticated legal system, complete with thousands of laws, regulations, and the third 
highest number of practicing lawyers in the world.20 Changes during this reformation 
period were focused on reestablishing legal tools for absolute control over PRC citizens. 
Harsh penalties were established to dissuade PRC lawyers from taking on sensitive cases 
that involved defending the individual rights of PRC citizens.21 Both the rule of law and 
legal apparatus of the PRC were primarily centered on placing more power and resources 
towards advancing PRC interests. This focus would significantly influence the PRC 
views on lawfare and decision to create a lawfare doctrine.  
                                                 
18 Orde F. Kittrie, Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), 164. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
13 
The concept of current lawfare and the PRC lawfare doctrine can be traced back 
to Unrestricted Warfare, in which two officers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
discuss how to address wars and conflict in the 21st century. In the text of Unrestricted 
Warfare, authors Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui present a variety of future strategies 
that the PRC can employ to defeat a technologically superior adversary through several 
alternative modes of action.22 These strategies encompass the ideology of Sun Tzu, 
stating that “to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the pinnacle of 
excellence; defeating the enemy without fighting is the pinnacle of excellence.”23 To that 
end, the PRC lawfare doctrine is comprised of three primary warfare methods: legal 
warfare, psychological warfare, and public opinion or media warfare. 
Legal warfare includes all of the lawfare strategies and lawfare campaigns of the 
state. The objective for legal warfare in the warfare trilogy is to utilize all available state 
legal assets to achieve the political and military objectives of the PRC.24 The 
psychological leg of the warfare trilogy encompasses the efforts of the PRC to hinder an 
adversary’s capacity to make and justify decisions against the PRC.25 The objective for 
psychological warfare is to effectively wear down the ability for the leadership of an 
adversary to take decisive actions, while also seeking to defend against the capacity for 
the rival state to make alternative moves to counter PRC operations. Public opinion or 
media warfare is defined as the “the struggle to gain dominance over the venue for 
implementing psychological and legal warfare.”26 The goals of media warfare are to 
                                                 
22 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing 
House Arts, 1999), 19. 
23 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ed. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University, 1971). 
24 Stefan Halper, China: The Three Warfares. (Washington: University of Cambridge, 2013). 29. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Dean Cheng, "Winning Without Fighting: Chinese Legal Warfare," The Heritage Foundation, May 21, 
2012, accessed December 26, 2016. 
14 
preserve friendly morale, alter an enemy’s situational assessment, weaken an enemy’s 
will to fight, and generate support at home or abroad.27 As opposed to legal and 
psychological warfare, public opinion warfare can be undertaken during times of peace as 
well as implemented during times of conflict. These three pillars of warfare have been 
woven into the framework of Chinese military strategy. These strategies are illustrated as 
falu zhan, or “legal warfare.”28 The discussion of legal warfare in Unrestricted Warfare 
would also provide a modern operation definition for the PRC lawfare strategy.  
As previously discussed in Chapter 1, the PRC definition of Lawfare is the use of 
various means, including international law, to create a change in the strategic 
environment without the use of military action.29 As this definition would imply, the 
strategy for this strategy of lawfare should be to use legal warfare strategies instead of 
physical confrontation or before physical confrontations begin.30 In the 21st century, the 
PRC has implemented this lawfare strategy in the areas of maritime, aviation, space, and 
cyberspace. Using lawfare in these areas have helped the PRC in its singular objective to 
extend its territorial sovereignty through shaping international opinion. Out of all PRC 
lawfare operations currently in contention, none is more easily identifiable than China’s 
maritime lawfare strategy. 
  
                                                 
27 Stefan Halper, China: The Three Warfares. (Washington: University of Cambridge, 2013). 
28 Orde F. Kittrie, Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), 162. 
29 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing 
House Arts, 1999), 19. 
30 Dean Cheng, "Winning Without Fighting: Chinese Legal Warfare," The Heritage Foundation, May 21, 
2012, accessed December 26, 2016. 
15 
PRC Maritime Lawfare 
One of the more contentious areas of focus for the PRC lawfare strategy is in the 
field of international maritime law. The PRC has taken particular stances on articles of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and internationally 
observed Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ).31 By artificially creating man-made islands 
in the South China Sea, the PRC is attempting to incorporate the newly created islands as 
part of its coastal territory, effectively extending its EEZ 200 miles into international 
waters.32 This new EEZ has been carved out of the existing EEZ’s of other coastal states 
in the South China Sea. By claiming exclusive rights to this expansive territory, the PRC 
is also arguing that it has the sole right to regulate all forms of traffic through the area: to 
include both military and commercial maritime and aviation vessels. In doing so, the 
PRC can achieve its overall lawfare strategy for it's maritime and national security 
interests. 
The overall objective of the PRC’s naval lawfare strategy is to simultaneously 
usurp individual access to fishing and shipping lanes while providing an extended buffer 
zone against adversary warships.33 To gain a better understanding of how the PRC is 
attempting to achieve this lawfare objective, one must understand the articles of the 
UNCLOS and EEZ that the PRC is exploiting. The first, the UNCLOS, is an international 
multilateral agreement regarding the demarcation of territorial sovereignty among all 
coastal states. 
                                                 
31 Orde F. Kittrie, Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), 166. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
16 
The purpose of the UNCLOS is to affirm that the territorial sovereignty of coastal 
states extends 12 nautical miles beyond the end of its land territory and secure the rights 
to certain resources within that area.34 This convention establishes customary laws for 
empowering coastal states to regulate the entering and exiting of ports and to preserve 
freedom of passage for flagged vessels of all countries in international waters. 
Additionally, outside of the 12-nautical mile demarcation, the UNCLOS observes the 
right of use for all states to use international waters to pursue maritime and security 
interests. For traditional great power states, the UNCLOS provision on international 
waters has provided the ability to project force into the region.35  
Article 55 of the UNCLOS defines an EEZ as the area beyond and adjacent to a 
territorial sea in which a state is entitled to specific rights within that area.36 Article 55 
provides coastal states with the sovereign right of exploration, exclusive access to all 
natural resources both in the ocean and the corresponding seabed, and jurisdiction over 
the EEZ. According to the stipulations of the UNCLOS, these rights only extend up to 
“200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured.”37 By creating artificial islands within its established EEZ, the PRC’s strategy 
to extend its EEZ is to make claims that the origin of its coastal baseline should be 
calculated 200 nautical miles out from the shorelines of those islands.  
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In the context of international law, a variety of different means can change 
customary laws: pronouncements from international tribunals, diplomatic statements, an 
established precedent of military operations, and the writings of legal scholars.38 These 
events serve as a precedent for future actions within the international community. The 
PRC has used this standard practice to achieve its maritime lawfare strategy. In addition 
to its territorial claims to man-made islands and marine operations within the South 
China Sea, the PRC is also actively engaged in a multilateral communications effort to 
substantiate its claims to the expanded EEZ. This strategic communications campaign 
includes international legal writings from the Chinese authors, operations to shape 
domestic legislation claiming the territory, and declarative statements in an international 
arena.39 An especially aggressive event in this communication campaign occurred in 
2009 when the PRC disseminated a map showing China’s expansive claims in the South 
China Sea. 
In May of 2009, the PRC dispersed two formal documents to all UN member 
states.40 The first report said China’s indisputable claim to the contested islands in the 
South China Sea, the exclusive rights to all the surrounding waters and subsoil, and 
immutable jurisdiction over the territory above.41 The second document contained a map 
indicating China’s claim, demarcating its new coastal EEZ with a nine-dash-line. Also, 
marked on the map were the regional EEZ’s as recognized by the international 
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community. In 2013, the Philippine’s invoked Article 297 of the UNCLOS, causing the 
territorial dispute to go before the Permanent Court of Arbitration.42  
The Permanent Court of Arbitration had three overarching claims to settle 
between the PRC and the Philippines. First, the Philippines complaint argued that the 
PRC’s interpretation of the nine-dash-line conflicts with provisions of UNCLOS.43 
Second, Philippine’s challenges some contested reef formations, asserting that the 
structures do not meet the definitions of islands. Subsequently, these disputed islands do 
not substantiate China’s claims to the extended EEZ. Third, the Philippines argued that 
the PRC law enforcement operations in the region was inconsistent with UNCLOS 
obligations, and interfered with the Philippine sovereignty.44  
 
PRC Aviation Lawfare 
Similar to the maritime lawfare strategy of the PRC, the aviation policy of the 
PRC has primarily focused on denying operational space for the U.S. and its regional 
allies. Under the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, all states have 
complete sovereignty over the airspace above its territory as recognized by the 
international system.45 Currently, the PRC is capitalizing this observed right and 
combining it with its strategy on extending its EEZ to reach China’s territorial airspace. 
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These concurrent claims pose a unique challenge for the U.S. and its regional allies 
conducting aerial operations in this contested area. 
By extending its airspace sovereignty claims, the PRC has put itself at odds with 
the U.S. government. The tension between the U.S. and China stems from safety 
concerns over several air-to-air encounters between military aircraft.46 These security 
concerns are supported by a 2001 incident in which a Chinese F-8 fighter jet interceptor 
collided with a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance plane 75 miles off the coast of Hainan Island.47 
The incident resulted in the death of the Chinese pilot and the U.S. pilot needing to 
perform an emergency landing in Chinese territory. The U.S. crew aboard the damaged 
aircraft were taken into Chinese custody and detained for 11 days.48 It is likely that these 
concerns will continue to be an issue as U.S. aircraft operations continue in contested 
airspace. Another area of contention between the U.S. and the PRC is over the 
applicability of international law in cyberspace.  
 
PRC Interpretations of Law of Armed Conflict in Cyberspace 
Another area of PRC lawfare that is becoming of great concern to the U.S. is 
China’s views of lawfare in cyberspace. The concept of cyber warfare and cyberspace is 
a relatively recent phenomenon. Subsequently, customary international law and 
international conventions that would regulate the scope and application of international 
laws in cyberspace has yet to be universally agreed. The main area of concern regarding 
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the use of lawfare and the field of cyber is how the LOAC applies to acts of cyber 
warfare.  
The LOAC plays a major role in preventing and managing hostilities between 
nations before and through the duration of a conflict. International laws and practices in 
this subfield of international law are broken into two categories: Ius ad Bellum and Ius in 
Bello.49 Ius ad Bellum establishes the prohibition of the use of force in international 
relations.50 Ius in Bello outlines international laws to be observed during times of 
conflict. 51 Both categories of international law work to support and promote Article 1 of 
the UN charter which is the prohibition of war and promotion of international peace and 
security among member states.52 Additionally, both categories seek to protect innocents 
by differentiating between combatants and noncombatants. China’s public statements 
towards the role of LOAC in cyberspace bears significant implications for other states 
and their citizens. 
Correlating with advances in technology, the PRC has repeatedly stated that the 
obligations of LOAC and other international laws do not apply in the field of cyberspace. 
China has substantiated these claims by saying that even though cyber attacks are acts of 
aggression, they do not violate the territorial integrity or sovereignty.53 Furthermore, the 
PRC also observes that it is impossible to discriminate between military and nonmilitary 
targets in cyberspace and that Internet attacks can pose a serious challenge on managing 
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collateral damage to noncombatants.54 China has, however, made concessions that the 
international community outline a certain level of voluntary restraint towards cyber 
operations.  
In January 2015, the PRC along with other member states of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, 
and Uzbekistan submitted a proposal to the UN Secretary-General for a “voluntary code 
of conduct for information security.”55 The 2015 proposal noted an initial attempt to draft 
similar legislation in 2011, and that the new proposal included some of the comments and 
critiques of the previous proposal.56 The proposal also illustrated the need to prevent the 
potential use of technologies in operations that would otherwise threaten international 
peace and security or the infrastructure within states.57 This proposal was viewed 
suspiciously by the U.S. and other countries, as it appeared to be in contradiction of the 
previously demonstrated views of the PRC. The threat of cyber warfare and the continued 
PRC strategy of denying the applicability of existing international laws and the LOAC in 
cyberspace is a grave concern to the U.S. and other potential adversaries.  
By challenging the relevance of current international laws in cyberspace, the PRC 
can set a powerful precedent that solidifies a significant asymmetrical advantage over its 
opponents. Indeed, the power for the PRC to disrupt the ability of a military force like the 
U.S. to communicate with its military leaders and theater assets can render a 
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conventionally superior U.S. incapable of responding to PRC military operations. 
Additionally, a similar style of cyber-attack can threaten the ability for the U.S. to launch 
a nuclear second strike in the event of a nuclear exchange.  Cyberspace has already been 
established as a central component of Chinese military strategy, having a demonstrated 
the capacity to sway future kinetic military operations for the PRC over a superior 
adversary.58 Subsequently, both cyber warfare and lawfare strategies to preserve this 
capability is of great importance to the Chinese government.  
By taking stances that cyber operations are bound by the LOAC, the U.S. has 
voluntarily placed restrictions on its military operational capacity.59 This disparity 
provides the PRC with a substantial asymmetrical advantage over the U.S. Subsequently; 
the PRC is likely to leverage this U.S. self-imposed restriction on cyber warfare to 
continue its cyber operations without fear of military reprisal. Another area of territorial 
dispute for the PRC involves designations of territory in outer space.  
 
PRC Lawfare In Outer Space 
Like the maritime and aviation lawfare strategies implemented by the PRC, China 
is also using lawfare to advance its territorial interests in space. Chinese scholars have 
demonstrated these interests by insisting that China’s territorial claims do not end at the 
edge of their controlled airspace, but rather their sovereignty extends indefinitely 
upwards from the edges of China’s claimed territorial land borders.60 The PRC stance on 
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outer space sovereignty poses a direct challenge to the positioning and use of satellites by 
the international community. This assertion of territorial sovereignty in space; however, 
contradicts all standing international agreements, including the Outer Space Treaty and 
the Convention on International Civil Aviation, in which a general understanding of 
space operations is observed.61 The difference in interpretation of territorial sovereignty 
has led to conflict and contention between the PRC and the U.S. 
In a pronouncement on U.S. national space policy, the U.S. has asserted that it 
rejects any claims to territorial sovereignty by any state in outer space, indicating that it is 
the observed right of all states to conduct operations in outer space and that those 
operations shall not be interfered with by other states.62 The dispute over territorial 
sovereignty in outer space is a serious concern to the US, one of the several states that 
rely heavily on its ability to collect, receive, and transmit data using satellite 
communications. These satellites help the U.S. communicate and conduct operations 
across the globe. Subsequently, the possibility of territorial sovereignty being observed in 
outer space poses a significant threat to the U.S. and its operational capacity. Another 
area of concern for outer space territorial sovereignty is regarding the field of arms 
control.  
The ability to observe and verify compliance by national technical means has 
been a foundational point of all the key arms control agreements in which the U.S. is a 
party. Moreover, while the U.S. is not currently involved in a bilateral arms control 
agreement with China, any future arms control agreements are likely to have a 
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verification clause that will be conducted by satellite verification. It is unlikely that these 
disagreements over territorial sovereignty will be settled outside of a court of arbitration, 
which can have collateral effects on any future arms control agreement between the U.S. 
and China. 
 
Future PRC Lawfare and Potential Responses for the U.S. and Its Allies 
Based on previous lawfare initiatives over the past several decades, it is likely that 
the PRC will continue its aggressive lawfare operations to achieve its strategic interests. 
It would seem unlikely that a state that had previously viewed the rule of law as a 
hindrance to the flow of the communist revolution would be so successful at employing 
lawfare strategies to achieve its strategic interests. Indeed, the argument can be made that 
the decision to dismantle its entire legal apparatus served effectively as a reset button, 
leaving the PRC able to rebuild its entire legal system from its foundations. 
Subsequently, the PRC currently has the third largest number of lawyers in the world, 
sophisticated legal institutions, and a growing interest in growing its number of 
international lawyers.63 Based on these investments, it is likely that future PRC lawfare 
operations will only become more sophisticated in the future. Other states in the 
international community will likely be faced with the decision on how to best address, 
contain, and counter PRC lawfare operations.  
Depending on how much a state would like to invest in its lawfare activities, there 
are several possible strategies that can either counter or at least hinder PRC lawfare 
strategies. States not wishing to develop their lawfare strategy can disrupt Chinese 
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lawfare operations by challenging the PRC’s territorial claims and pushing for 
international reform in cyberspace. The danger in the PRC lawfare strategy is that many 
of the assertions that they are proposing are not being universally refuted by the 
international community. If left unchallenged, the current PRC claims in the South China 
Sea and about its airspace, outer space, and cyberspace can set a precedent for future 
international actions.  
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Chapter 3: ISRAEL AND PALESTINIAN LAWFARE 
 
Similar to how the Spanish Civil War served as a laboratory to test out tactics 
later used in World War II, one can look at the use of lawfare by both the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) and Israel during the Israel-Palestine conflict as a testing ground for how 
states can employ lawfare during an armed conflict. Moreover, analyzing the lawfare 
strategies and motivations for Israel and Palestine to use lawfare, one can gain a better 
understanding of the impact that lawfare can have in shaping a conflict from a military, 
diplomatic, and strategic level. To get a better understanding of the mentalities and 
purpose for Israel and Palestine to adopt lawfare strategies, one must understand the 
historical background of the conflict. 
The Israel-Palestine conflict has historically been fueled by territorial disputes and 
over access to mutual religious sites. In the aftermath of World War II, the UN proposed 
partitioning the territory of Palestine into two sovereign states. One-half of the area 
would remain the Arab country of Palestine.64 The other half of the area would go to 
resettling the Jewish state of Israel, which had made historical claims to the territory 
before Palestinian occupation.65 In sum, neither state was adequately appeased by the 
two-state proposal, and an ensuing conflict over territorial claims and access to religious 
sites within the territory are still a center focus of the conflict to date. 
In the modern lawfare case study of the Israel-Palestine conflict, the two ruling 
governments represent the interests of the Palestinian Arabs. Presently, the PA is in 
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control over the territory surrounding the West Bank. The other Palestinian-controlled 
territory, the Gaza Strip, is ruled by Hamas, a designated terrorist organization on the 
U.S. Department of States terrorist list.66 It is important to note that while both ruling 
parties have employed lawfare strategies to hinder or otherwise hamper Israeli operations, 
references to the Palestinian lawfare campaign are representative of the lawfare 
operations conducted by the PA operating in the West Bank. While Hamas has conducted 
lawfare operations in the Gaza Strip, the scope of their lawfare tactics has been focused 
on enhancing their kinetic military operations and to prevent states from using their 
forces to target Hamas operatives.67 When analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of a 
lawfare strategy, focusing on the lawfare operations conducted by the PA would be more 
fruitful than the lawfare activities of Hamas. Subsequently, an analysis of Hamas lawfare 
strategy will not be addressed in the Israeli- Palestinian case study.   
 
The Palestinian Lawfare Campaign: The Search for Statehood 
The central objective of the Palestinian lawfare campaign is to leverage existing 
legal instruments and to work within the constructs of the international system to achieve 
recognition of statehood. In doing so, the PA is attempting to draw an end to decades of 
negotiations that has been unable to bring Israel and Palestine any closer to a solution of 
the Israel-Palestine conflict. The primary imperative for state recognition is that it will 
provide critical legal standing in the ongoing territorial dispute between the territories of 
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Israel and Palestine. The first notable step in the lawfare campaign for state recognition 
was the 1988 Palestinian universal declaration of independence.  
In the aftermath of the first Intifada, the 1988 universal declaration of 
independence observed the inherent need for Palestinian sovereignty against Israeli 
occupation in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.68 To that end, the document made the 
unilateral claim that the territories of the Gaza Strip and West Bank were now officially 
declared to be Palestinian sovereign territory, establishing Jerusalem as a provisional 
capital.69 Additionally, the universal declaration of independence tasked the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization with the power to rule over the defined territory of Palestine, all 
Palestinian’s living in these territories, and recognized the right of the Palestinian people 
to fight against foreign occupation.70 The 1988 Palestinian universal declaration of 
independence would have a significant impact on the Palestinian path to statehood. 
As previously discussed in Chapter 1, statehood, as defined in the Montevideo 
criterion, is crucial for engaging in the process of creating international laws. The 1988 
Palestine universal declaration of independence established a presence to three of the four 
requirements for statehood outlined in the Montevideo criterion; Palestine now only 
needed to demonstrate its capacity to enter foreign relations. In the years since the 1988 
universal declaration, the US, Israel, and other opposition states have undertaken a joint 
effort to block Palestine’s recognition to statehood. 
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After Palestine had released its universal declaration of independence, the U.S. 
indicated that it refused to acknowledge the declaration, and urged Palestine to resume 
peace talks between Israel and Palestine.71 The stance of the U.S. was not necessarily to 
refute Palestine’s right to sovereignty, but rather place importance on coming to a 
resolution to the conflict through peace talks between Israel and Palestine. While the 
universal declaration of independence did not directly affirm Palestine’s sovereignty, it 
was a significant success story of using an understanding of international law frameworks 
and lawfare to cause a change in the strategic environment. This early success in lawfare 
would serve as a model for the future lawfare strategy of the PA. 
A quote from PA President Mahmood Abbas accurately summarizes the 
preference and perspective of the PA lawfare strategy. In a 2011 Op-Ed published in the 
New York Times, President Abbas described the PA lawfare strategy as “an 
internationalization of the conflict as a legal matter, not only a political one.”72 This quote 
encapsulates the objective for the Palestinian lawfare strategy: to gain legal standing 
within the international system to bring an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a way 
that favors Palestinian interests. In the 21st century, the lawfare campaign of the PA is 
conducting in three different campaigns. The first lawfare campaign is Palestine’s 
continued effort to gain admission to the UN as a full member state. Palestine’s second 
lawfare campaign was the appointment process to the International Criminal Court. 
Palestine’s third lawfare campaign encompasses individual legal action against the state 
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of Israel to achieve alternative objectives that benefit Palestine. The first purpose of the 
PA lawfare strategy, gain admission to the UN General Assembly, remains a central 
imperative for Palestine.  
Palestine’s admission to the UN is an integral component of the PA lawfare 
strategy as it represents a longstanding political objective for both the government and 
citizens living in Palestinian territory. By attaining recognition of statehood, Palestine 
will be able to bring more international attention its numerous complaints against Israel, 
as well as make future occupation by Israel illegal by international law standards. 
Moreover, by pursuing recognition of statehood outside of the negotiations process, 
Palestine is hoping to attain its end goal of territorial sovereignty without conceding 
anything to the state of Israel. The importance of reaffirming Palestinian rights and 
decision to seek state recognition within the international system was observed in a quote 
from President Abbas when he noted that “If we don’t obtain our rights through 
negotiations, we have the right to go to international institutions.”73  
In a 2011 speech delivered the UN General Assembly, President Abbas 
announced that he had officially applied for Palestine’s admission as a full member 
state.74 The membership was notably controversial, making territorial claims based on 
June 4, 1976, territorial borders, with Al-Kuds Al-Sharif as its identified capital.75 The 
U.S. and other UN members opposed Palestine’s application. 
                                                 
73 Middle East Institute, "Abbas to Act against Israel at UN If Peace Talks Fail,” Middle East Institute, 
2013, accessed December 08, 2016, http://www.mei.edu/content/abbas-act-against-israel-un-if-peace-talks-
fail.  
74 UN News Center, "Security Council refers Palestinian application to UN membership committee," 
United Nations News Center, September 28, 2011, accessed September 12, 2016, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39863#.WUWFXmjytPY. 
75 Orde F. Kittrie, Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), 201. 
31 
The source of opposition from the US, among other states of the UN General 
Assembly, was the belief that the only way to achieve lasting peace between Israel and 
Palestine was through a mutual peace process between the two states.76 This basis of this 
position stems from observations of both Israel and Palestine throughout the duration of 
the negotiation process. Additionally, at the time of Palestine’s application submission, 
Israeli legal advisers claimed that Palestine’s application violated the terms of Article 
XXXI (7) of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, which prohibits either state from 
seeking to change the contested territorial status of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.77 
Other states that oppose Palestine’s application to become a full member state cite the 
fact that Palestine did not meet the international legal standards for independent statehood 
as stipulated in the Montevideo criterion. Nevertheless, the Palestinian application to 
become a full member state proceeded undeterred.  
To become a full member state in the UN General Assembly, the UN requires 
either an affirmative vote or vote of absentia from all members sitting on the UN Security 
Council. Additionally, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council: the 
United States, China, the Russian Federation, France, and the United Kingdom, can veto 
an application.78 A single veto vote results in a rejection of the application.79 Noting the 
U.S. disapproval of the application, UN General Assembly Resolution 67/19 was voted 
on by the UN General Assembly to elevate Palestine’s membership status. If passed, the 
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resolution would elevate the status of Palestine to a non-member, observer state. 
Additionally, the resolution also promoted the continued pursuit of a peace accord 
between Israel and Palestine. The result of UN General Assembly Resolution 67/19 was 
approved with 138 states in favor, nine votes opposed, and forty-one states are 
abstaining.80 As a nonmember state, Palestine would be able to join onto other 
international organs and agreements. Following the passage of UN General Assembly 
Resolution 67/19, Palestine readied its next lawfare operation, while Israel and the U.S. 
looked to deter any further applications.  
Before the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 67/19, Palestine received 
full member recognition by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO).81 The result of the UNESCO vote on Palestinian membership 
was 107 member states in favor, 14 votes against, and 52 states abstaining.82 In response 
to this vote, both the U.S. threatened to withdraw its funding contributions to the 
organization, approximately 22% of UNESCO’s total budget.83 Back in the Middle East, 
Israel responded to the news of the UNESCO vote by increasing Israeli settlement 
activities in the West Bank.84 Moreover, both the U.S. and Israel threatened to pull their 
financial contributions from any other agencies considering admitting the PA to their 
organization. In response to these threats and counter operations, UN Secretary-General 
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Ban Ki-moon voiced his concern over the trajectory of these actions and called on all 
parties to act responsibly for peace.85 The result of the U.S. and Israeli counter strategy 
resulted in a two-year abatement of international agencies willing to consider Palestine’s 
admission to their organizations. To supplement this deterrent strategy, Israel and the 
U.S. also worked to create a negotiation window between the PA and Israeli 
governments. 
In July 2013, an initiative was taken up to generate more peace discussions 
between Israel and Palestine. Spearheaded by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, the 
Israeli government agreed to release 104 Palestinian prisoners in exchange for Palestine 
agreeing to refrain from applying to any international organizations for nine months.86 
Per the agreement, the Prisoners were divided into four groups and released in successive 
waves throughout the 9-month term of the agreement. The agreement, however, only 
lasted for eight months, resulting in a release of 78 Palestinian prisoners instead of the 
agreed 104.87 Although neither of the end terms of the deal was realized, the release of 
Palestinian prisoners is significant. 
Many of these prisoners were serving sentences for murder or other acts of 
terrorism against Israeli nationals.88 These Prisoners had been arrested and imprisoned 
before the signing of the Oslo accords entered force. In the eyes of the PA leadership, 
many of those prisoners were considered prisoners of war, adding a layer of emotion 
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regarding the release of these prisoners.89 After the conclusion of the agreement, the PA 
resumed its lawfare operations, looking for new opportunities to join various international 
organizations. The conclusion of this pause in lawfare operations marked the start of a 
new PA lawfare strategy: Joining the International Criminal Court.  
 
Palestine’s Ascension to the International Criminal Court: 
On April 1, 2014, PA President Abbas announced, on live television, that 
Palestine would resume its efforts to join existing international organizations and treaties. 
President Abbas did so by signing 15 applications for Palestine to join onto existing 
international agreements.90 The announcement cited that the decision to move forward 
with these applications was linked to Israel’s failure to release Palestinian prisoners by 
the end of March 2014 as stipulated in the negotiation process between Israel and 
Palestine.91 In response to this announcement, Israeli officials stated that Israel was not 
obligated to release the fourth wave of Palestinian prisoners since there had been no 
substantive negotiations between Israel and Palestine since November of the previous 
year.92 It is apparent that the PA had dedicated a considerable amount of time drafting a 
list of international organizations, treaties, and conventions for which to apply.  
According to chief PA negotiator Saeb Erekat, the PA had compiled a list of 63 
international organizations, treaties, and conventions that Palestine would apply for 
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member status.93 Included in this listed were the World Bank, the International Civil 
Aviation Organization, the International Maritime Organization, and the International 
Criminal Court.94 The U.S. response to the decision of President Abbas to put forward its 
15 applications was minimal. 
Although the U.S. had previously threatened to withdraw its monetary 
contributions from any organization of the UN that extended the same standing as 
member states, it took no such step after the news of Palestine’s applications to 15 
treaties. Instead, the U.S. issued letters of disposition, saying that international 
agreements are limited to sovereign states, and therefore Palestine should not be allowed 
to accede to these international treaties because it does not meet such a standard.95 By the 
end of 2014, the PA had officially submitted its application for membership to the 
International Criminal in addition to 19 other UN agencies. Palestine’s accession to the 
International Criminal Court entered into force on April 1, 2015.96 
Established in 1998, the International Criminal Court was established as the first 
international organization to have territorial jurisdiction over states in the international 
community.97 Under the preamble of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, “the primary mission of the International Criminal Court is to help put an end to 
                                                 
93 United Nations Associated Press, "Palestinians hold off on UN agency membership," The Times of 
Israel, May 21, 2013, accessed November 27, 2016, http://www.timesofisrael.com/palestinians-hold-off-
on-un-agency-membership/. 
94 Joe Lauria, "PLO Official Says Palestinians Will Seek to Join International Court," The Wall Street 
Journal, April 29, 2014, , accessed November 15, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/plo-official-says-
palestinians-will-seek-to-join-international-court-1398810549. 
95 Orde F. Kittrie, Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), 207. 
96 Michelle Nichols, Louis Charbonneau, and Thomas Escritt, "U.N. confirms Palestinians will be ICC 
member on April 1," Reuters, January 07, 2015, , accessed November 27, 2016, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-israel-un-idUSKBN0KG1JV20150107. 
97 International Criminal Court, "Understanding the International Criminal Court," International Criminal 
Court, 3, accessed November 22, 2016, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf. 
36 
impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole and thus contribute to the prevention of these offenses.98 The 
decision for the PA to join the International Criminal Court was made based on several 
key factors: domestic political concerns, external opposition to Palestinian statehood 
outside of the negotiation process, and a desire to address Palestine’s past complaints 
against the state of Israel.  
It was the assessment of analysts within the international community that 
Palestine’s application for the International Criminal Court has primarily used a vehicle 
to quell intense internal domestic pressures. In the days leading up to the signing of the 
application to the International Criminal Court, the New York Times observed unusually 
high levels of domestic political tension coupled with a need for President Abbas to 
regain some credibility with an “increasingly growing critical Palestinian population.”99 
This sentiment corroborated a 2014 poll showing that President Abbas’ approval rating 
had dropped to 35% from 50% earlier that year.100 Another possible reason for why 
President Abbas sought to join the International Criminal Court was as a means of 
bringing longstanding complaints of Israeli war crimes before the court.  
From a lawfare perspective, joining the International Criminal Court poses a 
strategic advantage for the PA. Not only does joining the International Criminal Court 
bolster Palestine’s ongoing case for statehood, but the physical seat also provides direct 
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access to air years of complaints against Israel in front of the international community. 
Some International Criminal Court experts have assessed however that Palestine’s seat on 
the court will not provide control over the court's proceedings against the state of 
Israel.101 Subsequently, Palestine’s seat at the International Criminal Court may not have 
provided as large of a bargaining chip as the PA would have hoped.  
 
Individual Legal Action Against Israel By Palestinian Non-Governmental 
Organizations and Their Allies 
Another active component of the lawfare strategy carried out by the PA is through 
independent legal action against Israel. This lawfare strategy includes legal proceedings 
waged by Non-Governmental Organizations acting on behalf of Palestine and its allies. 
This large and seemingly amorphous group of individuals and organizations are primarily 
interested in advancing the Palestinian cause for statehood. While the Palestinian 
government is actively engaged in lawfare operations within the international system, the 
volume of domestic complaints against both the state of Israel and Israeli government 
officials has severely hampered the ability for Israel to conduct operations to counter 
Palestinian efforts. One critical section of this group is individuals and organizations that 
have associated themselves with the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement. 
The Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement is an international campaign 
that employs legal, economic, and political pressure on the state of Israel to coerce 
compliance from the Israeli government. Active participants of the Boycott, Divestment, 
and Sanctions Movement leverage their economic and regional influence to disrupt the 
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flow of funding going to the Israeli government or any individuals that conduct business 
with the state of Israel.  
The movement encompasses of three primary objectives: ending Israel’s illegal 
occupation and colonization of Arab lands to include removing the wall, recognizing the 
fundamental equal rights of Arab-Palestinian citizens, and the Israeli recognition, 
acknowledgment, and protection of Palestinian refugees as stipulated in UN resolution 
194.102 The focus of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanction movement is to create 
universal jurisdiction so that individual citizens can pursue legal recourse against Israeli 
officials for alleged war crimes.  
The results of this campaign have been a significant number of civil suits brought 
against the state of Israel and members of the Israeli government. Although the majority 
of the suits against Israeli officials and the state of Israel have not resulted in large sum 
settlements paid to the plaintiffs, the amount of time, resources, and personnel needed to 
respond to these lawsuits has had an uncalculated negative impact on the Israeli economy 
and ability to conduct other operations. Subsequently, the volume of lawsuits brought up 
by members of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions Movement has significantly 
hindered the ability of the Israeli government to counter other Palestinian lawfare 
campaigns; making the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions Movement a useful 
component of the Palestinian lawfare strategy. This issue is likely to continue in the 
future, and the onus will be on the state of Israel to develop an effective solution for 
handling this volume of civil litigation. To respond to aspects of the lawfare strategy of 
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the PA, Israel has already developed a unique strategy: offensive lawfare waged by both 
public and private corporations. 
 
Israeli Offensive Lawfare: A Way to Mitigate Against Hostile Aggression 
Given its unique historical background and numerous perceived existential threats 
to its national security, Israel has taken a precarious stance on its aggressive use of 
lawfare. Israel’s hesitation to employ lawfare strategies is attributable to Israel’s fear that 
if it uses lawfare, it might set a precedent for adversarial states to conduct future lawfare 
operations against Israel.103 In terms of lawfare initatives waged by Palestine during the 
Israel-Palestine conflict, it is evident that it is imperative for the Israeli government to 
respond with lawfare operations of its own. The Israeli government has taken a more 
private method of conducting lawfare operations to accommodate a need for a counter-
lawfare strategy. By providing information and other forms of material support to both 
private litigation firms and U.S. prosecutors, the Israeli government has been able to 
conduct lawfare operations while not being directly implicated in the process. By 
implementing this strategy, the Israeli government can wage offensive lawfare while 
adhering to its current commitments to international organizations and conventions. 
Within the scope of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there are several instances in 
which offensive lawfare was used that merit further study. By analyzing how Israel was 
able to use a private Israeli litigation firm to stop a flotilla from delivering an arms 
shipment to the Gaza Strip and going after terrorist financing operations by suing the Ban 
of China, one can gain a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of using 
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private entities to conduct lawfare operations on behalf of the state. These case studies in 
conjunction with Israel’s ongoing efforts to prevent Palestine’s path to statehood 
comprise Israel’s lawfare strategy. The first case study, using lawfare to stop an arms 
shipment, demonstrates the disruptive power that lawfare can have on an adversary’s 
military operations.  
 
Case Study: Israel Uses Lawfare to Stop Gaza-Bound Flotilla 
The 2011 decision for the Israeli government to use actionable intelligence and 
lawfare to prevent an arms shipment demonstrates the power that lawfare can provide to 
state governments. The Israeli government was able to provide a private Israeli law firm, 
Shurat HaDin, with critical information so that the company could prevent the arms 
shipment from being delivered to Hamas terrorists conducting operations in the Gaza 
Strip.104 The Shurat HaDin Law Center is a private group of ten attorneys that have taken 
information collected by Israeli intelligence services and conducted lawfare operations on 
behalf of the state of Israel. Based in Tel-Aviv, Shurat HaDin has a shared mutual interest 
with the Israeli government to protect the state of Israel from terrorist security threats.105 
Subsequently, the Shurat HaDin Law Center has championed several lawfare initiatives 
on behalf of the Israeli government. A quote from Nitsana Darshan-Leitner, the founder, 
and director of the Shurat HaDin Law Center typifies the mutual interest shared between 
the two parties and why a private litigation firm would agree to serve as a proxy in 
Israel’s offensive lawfare operations. 
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In an article published in the Jerusalem Post, Nitsana Darshan-Leitner observed 
that countries are confined by external pressures within the international system, which 
can restrict their ability to operate freely without constraint.106 Indeed, the constructs that 
have been created to bring order to an otherwise anarchical international system can 
sometimes prohibit the ability of a state to act in a way that would give the state an 
asymmetrical advantage within its strategic environment. Darshan-Leitner then made the 
point that private citizens are not required to abide by such limitations, and are therefore 
able to take actions that sovereigns just cannot undertake.107 This flexibility has allowed 
private organizations, like Shurat HaDin, to operate based on their personal interests and 
without the predisposition of wanting to protect the longstanding diplomatic relationships 
built between states. This lack of restriction allows for some degree of autonomy that can 
be highly beneficial to a country; however, it can also be a source of considerable 
controversy for the state.  
When state lawfare objectives shift away from the interests of the private 
organization conducting the lawfare operation, the tension between the two parties may 
develop. Such pressure has developed at various times during the Israeli-Shurat HaDin 
lawfare partnership due to flippant support from the Israeli and U.S. governments.108 An 
example that demonstrates the success of using private organizations to conduct an 
offensive lawfare operation is observable in the 2011 blockade of a Gaza-bound flotilla.  
In 2011, Israeli intelligence services received an intelligence report that a 
shipment containing weapons and ammunition was scheduled to depart from a Greek 
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harbor, travel through the Israeli blockade, and delivered to Hamas forces operating in 
the Gaza strip. The Israeli government approached the Shurat HaDin Law Center with the 
information and requested that they help stop the shipment of the weapons and 
ammunition was delivered to the Hamas operatives. After a brief period of research, the 
Shurat HaDin Law Center drafted a comprehensive plan that would give them legal 
standing to halt the shipment. 
The plan comprised of three phases: an issued warning to all maritime insurance 
companies operating in the region, a warning disseminated to the Inmarsat Global 
Satellite Company, and a filed lawsuit to seize the boat while the cargo was in transit. 
When paired with additional pressure leveraged directly against the Grecian government, 
this three-stage plan allowed the Shurat HaDin Law Center to act on behalf of the Israeli 
government to prevent a breach of the Israeli blockade without bloodshed. For the first 
phase of the three-step plan to be successful, the Shurat HaDin Law Center needed to 
conduct extensive research into Grecian shipping laws.  
After researching Greek shipping regulations, the attorneys at Shurat HaDin 
discovered that no commercial or merchant ship could exit a Greek port without proper 
documentation of maritime insurance.109 While the law center did not know the specific 
insurer of the flotilla, it decided to draft letters and send warnings to all insurance 
companies that provide coverage to merchant vessels operating in that region. Included in 
the letter was information stating that per U.S. Supreme Court Decision Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project, it is a federal crime to “knowingly provide material support 
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or resources to a directly or indirectly aid a foreign terrorist organization.”110 
Subsequently, any ship transporting shipments to Hamas forces in the Gaza Strip would 
be in violation of international law and intentionally violated the Israeli naval blockade of 
the Gaza Strip. These official warning letters were sent to all the main insurance 
companies that would be likely providing coverage to the flotilla; several of these 
insurers responded back to Shurat HaDin’s warning.  
Several maritime insurance firms responded to Shurat HaDin’s warning letter, 
stating that they would not knowingly insure any merchant vessels that were transporting 
materials to Hamas terrorists in the Gaza Strip.111 In a response letter from Lloyd’s of 
London, the company took an additional step by stating that their company underwriters 
would never allow the business to insure a shipment that would be in violation of law, as 
the potential costs of such a delivery would be too high.112 Whether Lloyd’s of London 
had any prior information about the shipment before receiving the Shurat HaDin warning 
letter remains unknown; however, by responding to the notice, Lloyd’s of London 
acknowledged that they would be legally liable if the flotilla shipment would proceed as 
scheduled. This response gave Shurat HaDin and the Israeli government additional 
leverage to help stop the shipment. With this early success, the Shurat HaDin Law Center 
proceeded with the second phase of its plan to halt the flotilla: to target an additional 
component needed for the ship to leave port. 
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Upon further research, the attorney’s at Shurat HaDin learned that maritime 
vessels are not permitted to travel in or out of Greek ports without a working satellite 
communications system. With that information in mind, Shurat HaDin focuses its efforts 
on applying pressure on Inmarsat. Based out of the U.S. and UK, Inmarsat was the sole 
provider of commercial maritime communication technologies to all marine vessels in the 
region, including the Mavi Marmara.113 The Mavi Marmara was involved in a previous 
Israeli interdiction operation in 2010, which resulted in the deaths of nine Turkish 
activists and the hands of Israeli forces.114 While the Mavi Marmara did not lead to the 
deaths of any Inmarsat personnel, it sent a serious message to the international 
community: Israel is prepared to break international law by attacking flagships to disrupt 
the flow of weapons and supplies to Hamas terrorists in the Gaza Strip.115 
In a similar letter to the ones distributed to maritime insurance companies, the 
Shurat HaDin Law Center made the same case that Inmarsat would be held criminally 
liable in U.S. courts for providing material support or resources to a foreign terrorist 
organization. Additionally, the letter to Inmarsat stated that they would also be held 
accountable for all future attacks on U.S. nationals by Hamas operatives.116 To further 
substantiate their claim, the Shurat HaDin cited Boim v Holy Land Foundation, a U.S. 
seventh circuit court of appeals decision that affirmed a previous settlement award of 
$156 million dollars to the family of David Boim, a U.S. citizen killed in a Hamas attack 
in the West Bank.117 Accompanying the letter was a civil complaint against both Inmarsat 
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and the CEO of Inmarsat claiming that Inmarsat is criminally liable for facilitating 
previous flotilla shipment that has provided material support to Hamas acts of terror.118 
In response to the letters and civil complaint from the Shurat HaDin Law Center, 
Inmarsat agreed to terminate all satellite communication services to the flotilla.119 In 
reciprocation to Inmarsat’s decision to comply with the Shurat HaDin Law Center, the 
law center dropped all civil complaints raised against both Inmarsat and its CEO.120 With 
the suspension of the flotilla’s insurance and communication operations, it was becoming 
increasingly unlikely that the flotilla was going to be able to leave Greek territorial 
waters. With the two difficult phases of the plan completed, the third and final stage of 
the plan was to apply pressure to the Greek government to uphold its maritime laws.  
In addition to using the threat of criminal liability against marine insurance and 
radio communication companies, the Shurat HaDin Law Center also filed a lawsuit in a 
U.S. federal court to seize the actual ships comprising the flotilla.121 The lawsuit filed on 
behalf of Dr. Alan Bauer, and American who was critically injured in a 2002 suicide 
bombing perpetrated by Hamas terrorists.122 The lawsuit claimed that per the Neutrality 
Act (18 U.S.C. § 962), whoever attempts to fit out or arm any vessel with the intent that 
the ship will commit hostilities against any state or citizen of which the U.S. is at peace 
with shall be subject to fines or forfeiture of property to redress punitive damages to the 
plaintiff.123 Based on this decision, the plaintiff claimed that even though the arms were 
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not installed to be used by the crew as a naval weapon system, they were still outfitted on 
the ship so that they could be transported to the Gaza Strip where they would be used to 
engage in hostilities. The case was dismissed, stating that Dr. Alan Bauer did not have the 
standing to pursue legal recourse.  
With all three phases of the plan in place, the Shurat HaDin Law Center began to 
apply pressure on the Greek government, stating that there may be ships attempting to 
leave port with improper insurance or a functioning satellite communication system. The 
Greek government responded by interdicting and inspecting several flotillas of ships 
trying to leave port.124 Ultimately, the Shurat HaDin Law Center was able to use U.S. 
federal laws and the threat of legal proceedings to leverage compliance from several state 
and non-state actors. The result was a success, demonstrating the power of using private 
litigation firms to conduct offensive lawfare operations that achieve state objectives. 
Additionally, stopping the flotilla using lawfare instead of military force confirmed that 
Israel could maintain an effective naval blockade of the Gaza Strip without having to 
resort to the use of military force against innocent foreign nationals.125 The second case 
study on Israel’s use of lawfare, Israel’s lawsuit against the Bank of China, represents 
Israel’s second lawfare campaign using the Shurat HaDin Law Center. 
 
Case Study: Israel Sues Bank of China for Assisting Financial Transfers to 
Terrorist Cells. 
By reviewing the decisions and actions of the Shurat HaDin Law Center and 
Israeli government when attempting to bring a lawsuit against the Bank of China, one can 
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gain an understanding of the potential pitfalls associated with using private organizations 
to conduct diplomatic lawfare operations on behalf of the state. The case study is 
comprised of several interrelated lawsuits filed in U.S. federal court, as many of the 
plaintiffs in these cases were the family members of the victims of Hamas terrorist 
attacks carried out between 2006 and 2008.126 Each of the suits alleged that the Bank of 
China was complicit in helping finance terrorist activities by knowingly facilitating 
financial transfers to two terrorist groups through accounts held by a Palestinian citizen 
Said al-Shurafa, a suspected terrorist leader.127 The Bank of China is the fourth largest 
back in the People’s Republic of China and is completely controlled and operated by the 
Chinese government.128 
Reportedly conducted at the request of the Israeli government, the plaintiffs 
moved forward with their individual lawsuits, claiming that Israel would provide any 
resources needed to prove their claims.129 The majority of the lawsuits hinged on whether 
the plaintiffs could sufficiently show that the Bank of China knew that it was knowingly 
complicit in facilitating terrorist transactions during the time of the terrorist attacks. The 
Israeli government was reportedly willing to produce Uzi Shaya, a former Israeli 
intelligence official, to prove that the Bank of China members knew of the 
transactions.130 
As a former intelligence officer, Shaya had reportedly met with officials from the 
Bank of China back in 2005. During this meeting, Shaya had provided the bank officials 
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with collected material evidence, bank account numbers, the names of the account 
holders, and evidence linking the account holders to a terrorist organization.131 Shaya 
recalled that after this meeting, the bank officials took no action to block any transactions 
or freeze the bank accounts in question.132 Shaya’s testimony and evidence would 
provide the only direct link proving that the bank officials were aware of the account 
activities and continued to facilitate the transfers between the accounts and the terrorist 
organization. Although the prospect of Shaya’s testimony seemed compelling, the Israeli 
government announced that not only would the government not produce Uzi Shaya as a 
material witness, but they issued a gag order barring his testimony in any of the lawsuits. 
Attorneys at the Shurat HaDin Law Center assessed that the Israeli government 
rescinded its initial offer to supply the plaintiffs with all the necessary resources to win 
their trials because the government had determined that Shaya’s testimony would cause 
irreparable damage to the diplomatic relationship between the People’s Republic of 
China and the state of Israel.133 Shaya’s testimony threatened to sever Israel’s diplomatic 
and economic ties with China, constituting over $8 billion dollars in international trade 
for the Israeli economy.134 While this trade relationship does not comprise the majority of 
Israel’s annual trade, it was significant enough for Israel to conclude that the pursuit of 
legal recourse was not worth the economic, domestic, or political capital lost. When the 
news of Shaya’s testimony was going to be suppressed, the attorneys of the plaintiffs 
looked to obtain a subpoena to compel Uzi Shaya's testimony legally. 
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Many of the families involved in the litigation process against the Bank of China 
fought to block Israel’s ability to suppress Uzi Shaya’s testimony. Many of the plaintiffs 
filed a brief stating that Israel should not be allowed to intentionally sabotage their cases 
after encouraging that they seek legal action.135 For the remainder of 2013, the debate on 
whether Israel has legal standing to suppress Shaya’s testimony in U.S. courts. These 
discussions were argued in several different legal and pollical forums, by members of the 
U.S. Congress, by Israeli officials, by Chinese diplomats, and representatives from the 
Bank of China.136 In July 2014, a U.S. federal court judge settled the debate by granting 
Israel’s motion to suppress Uzi Shaya from testifying in any case against the Bank of 
China.137 Without Shaya’s testimony, the plaintiffs were unable to prove their claims 
against the Bank of China. The entire process resulted in immense embarrassment for the 
Israeli government, frustration for the families seeking justice, and increased tension 
between the Israeli government and the Shurat HaDin Law Center. 
By shifting their priorities away from the lawfare operations, the Israeli 
government learned the potential negative repercussions of using private litigation firms 
to conduct lawfare operations on behalf of the state. Despite this tension, Israel was not 
completely dissuaded from using private litigation firms from conducting lawfare 
operations on behalf of the state. The case study, Israel’s use of military operations to 
supplement a lawfare operation, demonstrates an alternative perspective on the role of 
lawfare as a tool of statecraft.  
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Israel’s Use of Diplomacy and Instrumental Lawfare to Undermine Palestinian 
Statehood 
Within the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict, Israel currently enjoys a 
significant asymmetrical advantage over the Palestinian Authority. Although Palestine’s 
status within the UN has been upgraded to Non-member observer state, it is still seeking 
to get a full recognition of statehood. Until it can demonstrate a capacity to enter into 
foreign relations with another state, there is an inherent level of disparity between Israel 
and Palestine in the international arena. This advantage is observed when looking at 
Israel’s ability to issue pronouncements against Palestine’s applications to international 
organizations and challenges to Palestine territorial claims through Israeli settlements.  
The objective of this institutional lawfare strategy is to hinder Palestine’s path to 
statehood outside of the negotiations process. By focusing its institutional lawfare 
operations on blocking Palestine’s path to statehood, Israel can conduct a state-run 
lawfare campaign that has little chance of setting a precedent that could be later used 
against the state of Israel. Within this lawfare campaign, public announcements 
denouncing Palestinian applications to international organizations have received an 
increased amount of attention because the interaction is being conducted on an 
international stage.  
As previously discussed, upon hearing the voting results of UN General Assembly 
Resolution 67/19, Israel began taking steps to deter future applications from Palestine to 
other international organizations and agreements. The focus of this move was to block 
Palestinian recognition of statehood outside of the negotiation process, which would 
likely undercut all Israeli territorial claims to its disputed areas in the Gaza Strip and 
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West Bank. Moreover, recognition of Palestinian statehood would substantiate claims of 
Illegal occupation by Israel into Palestinian territory, forcing Israel to withdraw these 
troops or be in direct violation of the UN Charter.138 An area that Israel is heavily 
attempting to undermine and reduce Palestinian influence in the international system is in 
regard to Palestine’s appointment to the International Criminal Court.  
In terms of Palestine’s involvement with the International Criminal Court, the 
possibility of a preliminary investigation by the court is likely to pose a significant 
challenge to Israeli national security. In the eyes of the Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor 
Lieberman, the preliminary examination threatens to “harm Israel’s right to defend itself 
against terror.”139 Additionally, Lieberman stated that Israel would respond to this 
investigation by “… bring about the dismantling of this court which represents hypocrisy 
and gives impetus to terror.”140 In pursuing this investigation, Israeli officials believe that 
ICC is part of the problem promulgating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, not the solution. 
Subsequently, Lieberman began a campaign to persuade key contributing countries to 
withdraw their funding from the International Criminal Court. Comprising over half of 
the $158 million-dollar annual budget for the International Criminal Court, Israel targeted 
the top seven donors to this organization: Germany, Japan, Britain, Italy, France, Spain, 
and Canada.141 
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Case Study: Understanding the Difference Between State-Run Lawfare and Private 
Offensive Lawfare 
By looking at lawfare campaigns carried out by the state of Israel and private 
litigation firms, one can gain a better understanding of the advantages and disadvantages 
of conducting lawfare through indirect means. While Israel’s collaboration with the 
Shurat HaDin Law Center was able to effectively stop a flotilla shipment of weapons and 
supplies from leaving Greek shores, the lawfare operations to counter Palestine’s 
advances toward statehood in addition to pursuing civil litigation against the Bank of 
China demonstrated the potential for negative media coverage and political damage that 
can result from conducting overt lawfare operations in the public eye. The potential 
negative repercussions of conducting offensive lawfare operations reiterated the quote 
from Nitsana Darshan-Leitner when she observed that state relations are on a continuum 
in which they must carefully consider how each action will affect the diplomatic 
relationships that they have with other states in the international system.142 
If Israel had decided to conduct the lawfare operations of stopping the flotilla and 
suing the Bank of China at a state level, it is likely that Israel would have made a careful 
cost-benefit analysis to determine how pursuing legal recourse against the Bank of China 
would have on Israel’s longstanding relations with the People’s Republic of China. While 
it is unclear if Israel would have continued to pursue legal action against the bank is 
unknowable, it is likely that if the state decided to move forward with the case, they 
would not have suppressed Uzi Shaya’s testimony. Additionally, Israel would have likely 
been saved from the embarrassment of implementing a flippant strategy on an 
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international stage. However, since both lawfare campaigns were conducted by a 
singularly focused private entity, the decision to withdraw state support from the Bank of 
China resulted in significant damage to Israel’s image and reputation in the international 
system. By comparing the flotilla and Bank of China case studies, one can gain insight 
into the potential benefits of states collaborating with private organizations on lawfare 
campaigns. 
Based on the analysis of the flotilla and Bank of China case studies, it is apparent 
that there are clear advantages to collaborating with private entities. Specifically, a state 
conducting a lawfare campaign using litigators from the private sector can allow a state to 
outsource state objectives to private entities, allowing states to adapt and address changes 
in the strategic environment simultaneously. A state that could greatly benefit from this 
type of lawfare strategy would be the U.S. The U.S. currently has one of the highest 
concentrations of practicing lawyers and law firms that address a vast array of 
specialties.143 
 
Conclusions: Lessons Learned and the Future of Lawfare in the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict 
The tactics and lawfare strategies used in the Israel-Palestinian conflict provide a 
unique insight into the wide array of applications for lawfare. By looking at the lawfare 
strategies employed by the PA, it is evident that lawfare can have a tremendous impact in 
gaining additional attention from the international community to the plight of a state. 
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Disenfranchised by decades of calling for peace negotiations between Palestine and 
Israel, it is evident that leveraging lawfare to attain recognition of statehood is likely 
going to be the most effective way for Palestine to have its sovereignty affirmed. In the 
eyes of the PA government, recognition of statehood is the only way to attain a peaceful 
solution between Israel and Palestine. According to PA President Abbas, if Palestine can 
gain a better standing in the international system, the rest of the international community 
will be likely to enforce the provisions of the UN charter and pursue war crimes charges 
against the state of Israel for illegal occupation of Palestinian territory.  
Palestine’s three-pronged lawfare strategy demonstrates the ability for a weaker 
state or self-determination movement to use lawfare within the international system to 
achieve a military or political objective without the need for direct kinetic conflict. 
Palestine’s campaign for statehood in the UN has been particularly effective and is likely 
to continue to bring PA closer to full recognition of statehood. 
The PA’s appointment to the International Criminal Court is the most significant 
development of the PA’s lawfare campaign to date. Admission to the International 
Criminal Court will allow the PA to pursue additional levels of legal recourse against the 
state of Israel. Regardless of the decisions of those charges, the increased frequency of 
war crime charges against Israeli officials can be viewed as a red flag to the international 
community, prompting additional investigations into the regional conflict. Additionally, 
the longer that the PA has a seat on any international organization, the better case the PA 
will have on claiming that it is a state. The precedence has been set because only states 
are allowed to join international treaties or become members of international 
organizations.  
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Since the PA is a member of the International Criminal Court, it can make the 
claim that the seat is an affirmation of Palestinian statehood. Subsequently, the longer 
that the PA remains a member of the International Criminal Court, the more likely that 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will result in a two-state solution despite Israel’s protests. 
Almost as significant as the PA’s lawfare campaign in the international system is the 
lawfare campaign being waged by non-state actors on behalf of the PA. The Boycott, 
Divestment, and Sanctions movement is dedicated to ending Israeli occupation in 
Palestine and protecting the rights of Palestinian Arabs. By establishing precedents in 
Israeli and U.S. courts, both individuals and organizations associated with the Boycott, 
Divestment, and Sanctions movement can help pave the way for future litigation efforts 
against the state of Israel. 
Whether these cases against Israel will result in large sum settlements against 
Israel is somewhat irrelevant, as the threat of civil litigation may be enough to deter 
private corporations from conducting business with the Israeli government. Additionally, 
the increased frequency and time required for the Israeli government to respond to these 
civil complaints can distract the Israeli government from being able to conduct offensive 
lawfare campaigns against the PA. Continued pressure from members of the Boycott, 
Sanctions, and Divestment movement is likely to hinder Israel’s ability to counter the 
current PA lawfare strategy to achieve statehood. 
Although Israel’s lawfare strategy has been mainly used to prevent the 
advancement of PA lawfare initiatives, several concepts can be insightful for a state 
looking to incorporate lawfare tactics into its instruments of statecraft. By observing 
Israel’s efforts to counter Palestinian statehood in addition to the subsequent flotilla and 
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Bank of China case studies, other state leaders in the international community can 
understand the utility of leveraging existing legal infrastructures can have on delaying or 
outright denying an adversary without the need for direct military action. 
The purpose of Israel’s lawfare strategy is to counter the PA’s path to sovereignty 
and force Palestine back to the negotiation table. As a recognized state, Israel has an 
innate advantage over the PA. Although the PA is making significant progress towards 
full statehood as a member of the UN, Israel is currently able to leverage its influence as 
a UN member state to possibly block the PA from being admitted to international 
organizations or signing onto additional treaties. It will be imperative that Israel and its 
allies continue to try and block the PA’s path to statehood if they want the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict to be resolved through negotiated peace talks brokered by the US. If 
the PA attains recognition of statehood in the UN, it is assumed that peace negotiations 
between Palestine and Israel will deteriorate if not completely stop. 
The use of private and public collaboration between Israel and the Shurat HaDin 
Law Center is of interest to states with advanced legal apparatuses. The flotilla case study 
is a success story for how a state can leverage lawfare to proactively stop a shipment of 
supplies from reaching a terrorist organization. The innovative approach to identifying 
which domestic or international laws are leverageable allowed Israel to halt a supply 
shipment without causing an international incident or take direct military action against 
Hamas operatives in the Gaza Strip. Additionally, by disrupting enemy supply routes can 
provide a profound advantage to the military forces of the state. By cutting off Hamas 
supply routes, Israel was likely able to delay or prevent a future attack against the Zionist 
state, as Hamas leaders likely had to reassess their strategies with fewer supplies and 
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identify new supply routes. This lawfare strategy also likely deterred other international 
organizations from conducting similar transactions with the terrorist group out of fear of 
being entangled in civil litigation. 
The Bank of China case study demonstrates the potential pitfalls of using private 
organizations to conduct lawfare operations. The sudden shift in priority left plaintiffs 
feeling marginalized by the Israeli government in addition to outraging several members 
of U.S. Congress. The Bank of China case study identified that the interests of private 
entities could differ from the sake of the state. When there is a difference between these 
two groups, private firms, like the Shurat HaDin Law Center, can go from being a key 
ally of the state to being one of its most outspoken critics. Additionally, firms like Shurat 
HaDin can also lead civil litigation suits against government actions. An example of this 
occurred during the Palestinian prisoner exchange. 
The concept of using collaborative private entities to conduct lawfare operations 
can have significant benefits for the state. From the perspective of Israel, using private 
litigation teams has allowed Israel to engage in lawfare tactics without fear of setting a 
precedent that can be used against Israel. Additionally, the flotilla success demonstrates 
that this lawfare strategy has some inherent validity to it. States looking to adopt a similar 
lawfare strategy should be aware of the potential drawbacks of shifting priorities and the 
potential to be held responsible for the actions of a private firm against another state. 
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CHAPTER 4: U.S. LAWFARE: AN OPPORTUNITY ANALYSIS 
 
It would seem intuitive that a state with one of the highest number or practicing 
lawyers in the world would also be a leader in the use of lawfare; however, the U.S. has 
had a limited history regarding the use of lawfare as an instrument of statecraft. There are 
several contributing factors as to why the U.S. has historically demonstrated less interest 
in developing a lawfare strategy. By looking at the American Bar Association lawyer 
census for 2015, one can observe that 75% of all practicing lawyers in the U.S. operate in 
private practice.144 The next highest concentration of practicing lawyers is in the 
government sector, constituting 8% of the total population.145 This demographic census 
might indicate that supporting U.S. interests from a legal standpoint is not the primary 
reason for a student to pursue an education in law. Although these demographics do not 
demonstrate an immediate support infrastructure to conduct an effective lawfare strategy, 
the array and diversity of legal expertise have the potential to provide a tremendous asset 
to the U.S. government. 
An advantage of having a diverse legal workforce is that the lawfare potential of 
the U.S. is that it can provide a presumptive lawfare program with a diverse set of legal 
assets. The potential of these assets places an imperative that members of the U.S. federal 
government or non-state actors seeking to take up a lawfare strategy need to be able to 
identify these elite legal individuals, recruit their service, and exploit their expertise on 
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behalf of the U.S. government. At times, hiring these top people can be a difficult task, 
with reasons stemming from personal interest, ideological reasons, or an inability for the 
U.S. government to compensate the lawyers for an equal level of wages that they can 
receive from working in the private sector. Difficulties with recruiting and attaining a 
cohesive legal strategy have hindered the ability to leverage its legal assets to conduct 
lawfare operations thoroughly. Despite these issues, the U.S. government does have a 
permanent cadre of legal staff in many agencies and military branches with the necessary 
background and expertise to conduct lawfare operations. 
In addition to a diverse set of legal assets, the U.S. also possesses several 
asymmetrical tools that it can use in lawfare campaigns. As a permanent member of the 
UN Security Council, the U.S. can unilaterally veto any measure that is presented before 
the council; a source of tremendous power within the United Nations. The U.S. also in a 
unique economic position within the global economy, which allows it to leverage its 
purchasing power to punish or hinder the capacity of other state or non-state actors to 
continue actions that are contrary to international laws or U.S. interests. These 
advantages allow the U.S. to make unilateral changes in the international system in the 
pursuit of state interests. The U.S. permanent seat on the UN Security Council provides 
an ongoing foundation in international politics. 
 
The UN Security Council: A Permanent Stage in the International Community 
As one of the five permanent members of the UN National Security Council, the 
U.S. has a unique advantage over all states in the international community. The UN 
Security Council is made up of five permanent members and ten countries elected for 
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two-year rotations by the UN General Assembly.146 The five permanent members are the 
US, China, France, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom, also known as the 
five identified nuclear weapon states in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.147 These 
permanent members have the sole power to veto resolutions that come before the security 
council.  
A single veto can defeat any Security Council Resolution. This right of veto 
provides immense power for the permanent members, as they have the authority to defeat 
an action based on their respective state interest unilaterally. Historically, this has 
provided a significant point of leverage for the US. There are two relevant case studies in 
which the U.S. has used its position on the Security Council to advance a U.S. interest or 
the interest of an ally. The first case study was the U.S. effort to stymie Palestine’s path 
to statehood after becoming a non-member, observer state. The second case study was a 
recent decision not to use its veto power to block a resolution demanding that Israel 
ceases building settlements in the West Bank. In doing so, the U.S. used lawfare to cause 
a change in the strategic environment that aligned with the interests of the state. The first 
case study of the U.S. using its influence within the international system and financial 
resources was to block Palestine’s path to statehood. 
As stated in Chapter 3, the U.S. and Israel have played active roles in Palestine’s 
path to statehood. In 2011, President of the Palestinian Authority Mahmood Abbas 
announced in a General Assembly speech that he had officially submitted its application 
to become a non-member, observer state. The US, among other countries, opposed this 
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action, saying that the only way to ensure a peaceful solution between Israel and 
Palestine is through US-brokered negotiations.148 This sentiment mirrored a quote from 
President Barack Obama. In an address to the UN General Assembly, Obama observed 
that “peace will not come through statements and resolutions at the U. N… If it were that 
easy, it would have been accomplished by now.”149 Before these speeches, the U.S. had 
already demonstrated its resolve to contest Palestine’s admission to other international 
organizations by threatening to withdraw its funding contributions from the UN 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization after it voted to admit Palestine as a 
full member of its organization.150 Undoubtedly, this threat had an impression on other 
organizations considering accepting Palestine into their ranks.  
In this case study, the U.S. demonstrated its capability to leverage its position and 
influence at the UN to advance its interests at the expense of another state. Although it 
was not ultimately successful at permanently blocking Palestine’s admission to other 
international organizations like the International Criminal Court, the process 
demonstrated that the U.S. could use its position in the UN to conduct future lawfare 
operations. The U.S. seat on the UN Security Council provides the potential for the U.S. 
to wield unique lawfare capabilities.  
The second case study that demonstrates the full potential of the U.S. seat on the 
UN Security Council was in 2016 when the U.S. could have unilaterally defeated a 
measure but chose to abstain instead. Additionally, this decision contradicted previous 
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actions taken by the U.S. regarding Palestine and Israel. On December 22, 2016, Egypt 
introduced a resolution before the UN Security Council to condemn Israeli settlements in 
the West Bank and East Jerusalem as illegal.151 While rumors of the vote had been 
circulating for some time, the sudden announcement and timing of the ballot were still 
somewhat of a surprise. In a call with his top national security advisers, Obama stated 
that he was not opposed to the idea of abstaining from the measure if there were no 
significant changes to the presumptive proposal.152 
The internal diaspora among U.S. officials was initially conflicted on the 
upcoming resolution; however, most agreed that taking a stand would be worth the 
potential backlash of both Congress and Israeli leadership. The increase in the building of 
Israeli settlements threatened to ruin any chances of future negotiations between Israel 
and Palestine.153 From the perspective of the rest of the UN, a U.S. veto would have 
implied that the U.S. approved with the Israeli settlements on Palestinian land.  
According to Secretary of State John Kerry, the building of Israeli settlements 
threatened to destroy any chances of a two-solution through negotiations.154 In a 
December address to the Dean Acheson Auditorium Secretary Kerry stated that the U.S. 
“could not, in good conscience, stand in the way of a resolution at the United Nations that 
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makes clear that both sides must act now to preserve the possibility of peace.”155 
Additionally, Kerry noted that the Obama administration has gone to great lengths to 
support the security of Israel, but that it would be a fallacy to think that the U.S. would 
vote in a manner just to align with the interests of an ally for the sake of appeasement.156 
Indeed, the U.S. has undertaken great lengths to support Israel and numerous efforts to 
delegitimize Palestine’s claims to statehood out of the negotiations process. Despite this 
historically supportive relationship, the U.S. still votes based on its strategic interests.  
The UN Security Council voted to condemn Israeli settlements on December 23, 
2016. Of the 15 members of the UN Security Council, all members except for the U.S. 
voted to approve the resolution.157 Included in these 14 votes of approval were the 
Russian Federation, China, and some of the closest European allies of the US. With the 
die cast, the U.S. voted in abstention, and the resolution passed without opposition.158   
The two case studies outline the power of the U.S. permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council. This seat, in addition to the veto powers enumerated to permanent 
members, could be a powerful tool for lawfare in future scenarios. By being a permanent 
member, the U.S. can create, introduce, lead the discussion on resolutions, or unilaterally 
overturn a ballot based on U.S. interests; allowing the U.S. to be an active participant in 
framing the decisions that shape global politics. Another lawfare tool that is at the U.S. 
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disposal is the ability to undercut another state's economy solely through controlling U.S. 
import-export trading with that country. 
 
Sanctions: A Tool of Economic Lawfare 
Another powerful tool in the U.S. lawfare arsenal is the ability to create and 
implement sanctions as a means of economic lawfare. Being one of the world’s largest 
economy, the U.S. has the capability to impose sanctions on its import-export trading 
relations with another state, which results in significant pressure being applied to the 
target state. The U.S. has also used its seat on the UN Security Council to pursue 
multilateral sanction efforts against countries like Iraq, Iran, and North Korea for 
noncompliance of international laws and weapons of mass destruction proliferation 
issues. Sanctions have the capacity to coerce a state to resume negotiations or hinder that 
state’s ability to continue with its noncompliant behavior. A case study that outlines the 
effects of prolonged U.S. unilateral and multilateral sanction efforts leading up to a 
conflict can be seen in the U.S. sanction campaign against Iraq. The sanction efforts 
against Iraq during the 1990’s leading up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq primarily focused 
on addressing the aggressive operations of the Saddam Hussein regime. 
In August of 1990, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 660, formally 
denouncing the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq.159 Shortly after that, the UN Security Council 
passed Resolution 661, a follow-up to Resolution 660 that also included language about 
sanctions on imported goods originating from Iraq and Kuwait.160 Resolution 661 
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outlined that all states will prevent the import of all commodities and products originating 
from Iraq or Kuwait.161 Additionally, each state will prevent any of its nationals from 
importing or dealing with any goods or flagships originating from Iraq or Kuwait, and a 
prohibition on the sale of weapons or any other military equipment to any person or 
organization in Iraq or Kuwait.162 These sanction efforts would set the stage for the 
passage of Resolution 687, authorizing the use of force to restore the territorial integrity 
of Kuwait and return its government. 
Passed on April 3, 1991, UN Security Council Resolution 687 authorized all 
member states cooperating with the Kuwaiti government to deploy military forces to 
restore Kuwait’s sovereignty. Moreover, the resolution observed Iraq’s possession of 
weapons of mass destruction and called for a complete dismantlement of all its chemical, 
biological, and all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers.163 The 
resolution also indicated a significant concern over reports from other member states 
being approached by Iraq to acquire components for a nuclear weapons program.  
By looking at the passage of 660, 661, and 687 demonstrated how the U.S. could use 
sanction resolutions leading up to a conflict. The passage of these resolutions imposed 
strict sanctions helped apply pressure on the Iraqi government before Operation Desert 
Shield. The use of U.S. sanctions and other economic lawfare operations against Iran 
demonstrated the power of leveraging sanctions to bring a state back to the negotiation 
table. 
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Following the fall of the Shah of Iran during the Iranian Revolution in 1979, 
relations between the U.S. and Iran quickly began to sour. Shortly after the seizure of the 
U.S. Embassy in Tehran, the U.S. imposed its first set of sanctions against Iran.164 In the 
decades following the Iranian Revolution, the U.S. has championed several waves of 
unilateral sanctions efforts, restricting import-export trading between the U.S. and Iran, 
and US-led UN Security Council Resolutions imposing import-export sanctions against 
Iran. The lawfare campaign implemented by the U.S. government focused on three 
primary objectives: using unilateral financial restrictions targeting Iran’s nuclear and 
terrorist operations, promoting financial measures against Iran with the cooperation of 
international organizations and key strategic partners, direct U.S. engagement with 
foreign financial institutions to deny services to Iran.165 By looking at the Iranian 
response to these sanction efforts; one can understand the sophistication of U.S. sanctions 
to bring a noncompliant regime to negotiations with a state that the government 
leadership despises.  
At the height of the U.S. sanction efforts against Iran, Iranian President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad referred to sanctions as “a hidden war… on a far-reaching global scale… a 
kind of war through which the enemy assumes it can defeat the Iranian nation.”166167 The 
use of sophisticated sanction efforts hindered Iran’s ability to sell oil to other states, 
utilize international bank transaction methods, and increased pressure on Iran’s nuclear 
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program. The net result of these forces was an Iranian leadership willing to negotiate 
imposed limitations on its nuclear program. 
On July 14, 2015, the P5+1 (the US, Russian Federation, China, United Kingdom, 
France, and Germany) announced that they had reached an agreement with Iran on a Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Stipulated in 
the JCPOA, Iran would agree to place constraints on its nuclear program in exchange for 
a reprieve from all nuclear-related sanctions currently imposed on Iran.168 In a prepared 
statement on August 05, 2015, President Obama praised the effectiveness of sanctions for 
making this agreement possible.169 The use of sanctions and other tools of financial 
lawfare allowed the U.S. to elicit compliance from an otherwise defiant regime.  
The Iranian lawfare case study demonstrates the U.S. capacity to create effective 
sanctions that apply significant pressure to another state while not causing significant 
adverse effects on the U.S. or global economies. This tools capacity to target a nation’s 
ability to finance its illegal operations allows the U.S. to apply a certain level of 
punishment over another sovereign and increase internal pressures for compliance with 
U.S. interests. In the example of Iran, sanctions were effective because it generated a 
significant burden for the Iranian regime. When looking at the U.S. of sanctions to 
dissuade North Korea’s nuclear program, it becomes evident that the use of sanctions and 
financial lawfare is ineffective when the leadership of the target country has no issue 
passing the hardships of sanctions onto its citizens. 
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Started under the George W. Bush Administration, the North Korean Illicit 
Activities Initiative was created to generate significant diplomatic leverage over North 
Korea. The focus of this initiative was to target North Korea’s illicit funding sources that 
were helping to offset the massive trade deficits caused by sanctions.170 To target these 
sources of financing, David Asher of the Treasury Department created a plan that called 
for the creation of an international law enforcement model that would promote 
cooperation between states in the international community. Through international law 
enforcement cooperation, the U.S. would be far more effective at shutting down North 
Korean illicit funding.171 The North Korean Illicit Activities Initiative ultimately failed to 
cut-off all of North Korea’s illegal sources of financing. Subsequently, it could continue 
funding its nuclear program despite severe hardships placed on North Korean citizens.  
The U.S. use of sanctions of financial lawfare against North Korea demonstrates 
the potential difficulties that can arise when attempting to use economic lawfare alone to 
coerce a totalitarian regime. Unlike the use of sanctions against Iran and Iraq, North 
Korea is more economically isolated from the world. Moreover, based on the penalties 
related famines, it is apparent that the North Korean regime values its nuclear program 
more than it values the welfare of its people.  
 
Financial Lawfare: The Power of Disrupting Terrorist Financing 
In the 21st Century, the U.S. effort to counter terrorism financing has arguably 
been one of the most successful lawfare campaigns that the U.S. has conducted. Under 
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the direction of the Obama Administration, the U.S. undertook a multiphase approach 
focused on identifying, targeting, and disrupting terrorist financing operations on a global 
scale. By looking at the Expanded role of the Treasury Department, implementing the 
U.S. counterterrorism strategy, and identifying funding sources to target, one can get a 
better understanding of how the U.S. could successfully conduct financial lawfare 
operations to stop the ability for terrorist organizations to finance their operations.  
Created by the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2004, the Department of 
Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis was established to advance U.S. national 
security interests and support the Treasury’s counterterrorism efforts.172 With its newly 
enumerated powers, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis started to craft innovative 
ways to target the $1.6 billion assets used by states to help fund terrorism activities.173 
“Treasury’s Under Secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence [was] sometimes 
described within the administration as President Obama’s favorite combatant 
commander.”174 This quote typifies President Obama’s preference for using the 
Department of Treasury to combat terrorist financing. The ability for the U.S. to identify, 
target, and disrupt terrorist financing is authorized under two Executive Orders. 
The ability of the President to coordinate measures to go after terrorist financing 
is primarily enumerated in Executive Order 13224 and Executive Order 13382.175 These 
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Executive Orders provide the statutory authority for the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The IEEPA provides the President with the authority “to 
deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or 
substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy or 
economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect 
to such a threat.”176  
Once the President has declared that threat as a national emergency, the President 
has the legal authority to prohibit the transfers of credit or payments between, by through, 
or to any banking institution, to the extent that those transfers involve the interest of a 
foreign country of foreign national associated with the national emergency.177 
Additionally, once the President has declared a threat as a national emergency, the 
President may also block, prevent, or otherwise void any acquisition, holding, use, or 
transfer between any person and a foreign national or country associated with the national 
emergency within the jurisdiction of the United States.178 These powers were used by 
enacted under President George W. Bush in 2005 to authorize the Department of 
Treasury to identify, target, and block the assets of foreign person determined “to have 
committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the 
security of U.S. nationals or the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the 
United States.”179 This authorization allowed the Treasury Department a significant 
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amount of freedom to think of creative solutions to target and combat terrorist financing 
operations around the world; demonstrating the capacity of U.S. financial lawfare to 
address emerging threats with effective solutions.  
 
U.S. Lawfare: Missed Opportunities  
As previously discussed, the U.S. can be a world power in the use of lawfare. The 
number and diversity of practicing lawyers, the status of the U.S. within international 
organizations, and the ability to influence the global economy provide an asymmetric 
lawfare advantages for the United States. While the U.S. has had periodic successes at 
utilizing lawfare-type strategies to address specific threats, the U.S. government has 
never identified these efforts as lawfare. Moreover, the U.S. Departments of State, 
Treasury, Justice, Defense, or any other element of the U.S. government has never 
allocated resources towards a lawfare component or developing a lawfare strategy to be 
used in a more strategic environment. Until the U.S. government establishes a sound 
lawfare doctrine that uses U.S. asymmetric advantages in the international system, it is 
possible that the U.S. will fail to capitalize on opportunities to advance its national 
interests or adequately defend against the lawfare campaigns of other states. 
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CHAPTER 5: AN ARGUMENT FOR THE U.S. TO ADOPT A LAWFARE 
DOCTRINE 
 
While Chapters 1 through 4 focused on analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of 
lawfare strategies implemented by China, the Palestinian Authority, Israel, and the U.S., 
Chapter 5 will focus on steps to develop a U.S. lawfare doctrine. As discussed in Chapter 
4, the U.S. has the potential to be a global leader in the field of lawfare; however, the 
U.S. has never openly considered a lawfare doctrine. Moreover, other states like China 
are likely to continue leveraging lawfare within the international community; causing the 
U.S. to develop countermeasures or concede to the interests of other countries. 
Conceding these battles may have collateral effects on a global scale.  
For example, if China’s claims to the South China Sea are uncontested, the 
Chinese government will have the standing to argue that there is a precedent that the 
international community acknowledges this territorial claim, allowing China the ability 
control all merchant traffic through the region. While the physical control over human-
made islands in the South China Sea does not pose a direct threat to U.S. interests, the 
ability for the PRC to control the flow of goods and U.S. military vessels through the 
South China Sea directly threatens U.S. national and economic security. The South China 
Sea example is only one of the many scenarios that the U.S. will likely have to address 
with legal action in the future. 
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The Future of U.S. Lawfare 
Similar to the need for the U.S. to develop new tactics, strategies, and intelligence 
tradecraft to combat the threat of terrorism after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the 
U.S., the U.S. will likely need to take similar measures to address the future threat of 
lawfare by other states in the international community. Although the U.S. does not have 
the luxury of knowing what the exact threats will be over the next decade and how to 
prioritize those threats appropriately, it can establish a basic lawfare apparatus that can be 
tailored to address or mitigate specific and emerging threats. If the U.S. does not 
experience a significant decrease in the number and expertise of its population of 
practicing lawyers, the U.S. will be able to leverage this pool of legal experts to handle 
threats to U.S. national security, even in an era of sequestration.  
Unlike the traditional cost to develop and maintain fixed military assets, funding a 
government agency or military units dedicated to conducting lawfare activities for the 
United States would be significantly cheaper. As stated in Chapter 1, states looking to 
conduct lawfare operations would only need to allocate funding for legal staff, 
administration staff, and an area of operations to conduct lawfare, whereas costs to 
increase military preparedness to a new threat has many additional costs other than just 
personnel. Presently, the U.S. has no formal governmental agency that is equipped or 
prepared to support the use of lawfare. The U.S. does however have several existing legal 
authorities that a lawfare program could be based on. 
Housed within the U.S. Department of State, the Office of the Legal Adviser 
provides legal advice on all domestic and international legal issues that arise from State 
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Department operations.180 This includes supporting department policy officials in 
formulating U.S. foreign policy, promoting U.S. adherence to international law, and 
international institutions that the U.S. is a party.181 The Office of the Legal Adviser is 
able to provide support to this broad range of directives with approximately 200 
permanent attorneys and 100 support staff. While the Office of the Legal Adviser would 
be well suited to take on the U.S. lawfare program, adding any additional mandate to the 
already overburdened office would likely result in an inefficient lawfare program.  
Another legal program that could support the U.S. lawfare program is the Office 
of the General Counsel at the Department of Defense. The General Counsel provides 
advice for the Department of Defense for all Defense related initiatives.182 While the 
Office of the General Counsel has the office experience of how to handle the legal issues 
of military conflict, it would be difficult for the office to provide the constant support that 
a U.S. lawfare program would require. 
The other legal department capable of supporting a U.S. lawfare program would 
be the Department of Justice Office of Foreign Litigation. The Office of Foreign 
Litigation is tasked with handling litigation in foreign courts in which the U.S. is a party 
or has a state interest represented.183 The Office of Foreign Litigation certainly has the 
legal expertise needed to support a lawfare program, but it is possible that the office 
would lack the diplomatic or military experiences required to create strategic lawfare 
courses of action. 
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The most effective course of action for the U.S. to stand up a lawfare element 
would be to create a department within the Department of Justice, State, or Defense. The 
presumptive lawfare program would likely require 200 practicing attorneys and 100 
support staff. The support staff will include paralegals, policy advisers, and 
administrative staff. The attorneys can be either be recruited from the private sector or 
assigned to the lawfare program as a joint duty assignment initiative from the 
Departments of Justice, State, and Defense. While creating a stand-alone agency would 
provide greater control over the culture and development of the U.S. lawfare mission, 
sequestering legal resources and office space from an already developed government 
agency will allow the U.S. government to stand-up a lawfare program quickly. After the 
lawfare element is created, the U.S. government will need to develop a lawfare doctrine 
to outline how the element is to conduct lawfare operations.  
 
A U.S. Lawfare Doctrine 
A Proposal for a U.S. lawfare doctrine would be to establish an organization that 
is responsible for identifying opportunities to use lawfare, drafting actionable courses of 
action involving the use of lawfare, and conducting lawfare operations on behalf of the 
United States. Creating such a framework helps to formulate a foundation of policies and 
procedures that allow an agency to create an adaptive lawfare strategies that address a 
developing threat and mitigate its effects on U.S. interests and national security. 
Additionally, the creation of a lawfare doctrine establishes a specific mission, scope, and 
strategic goals for the use of lawfare by the United States.  
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Mission 
The mission of the U.S. lawfare doctrine should be to identify, assess, and 
implement lawfare strategies that advance U.S. interests or counter the lawfare operations 
of other states. To that end, U.S. lawfare will need to work reactively and proactively to 
respond to emerging threats promptly. To accomplish this mission, lawfare strategists 
will need the freedom and flexibility to respond to both near-term and strategic threats. 
To maintain an effective balance between liberty and oversight, a more detailed scope 
must be outlined. 
 
Scope 
The scope of the U.S. lawfare doctrine would likely be general in nature to allow 
for an array of lawfare policy options to be implemented, but controlled with internal and 
external oversight. For lawfare to be effective, it must be allowed to explore creative and 
comprehensive solutions; however, if too much freedom is given without the presence of 
an oversight mechanism, the lawfare could threaten to become too detached from the 
lawfare mission statement. Subsequently, both internal and external oversight structures 
should be in place to monitor and ensure that the lawfare policies being enacted align 
with the mission statement of the lawfare doctrine, and the lawfare campaigns are 
consistent with current U.S. legal standards. 
 
Strategic Goals 
The stated strategic goals of the U.S. lawfare doctrine could be outlined as 
follows:  
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1.  To coordinate and use existing domestic and international legal instruments to 
advance U.S. interests. 
 
2.  To develop and implement new domestic and international legal instruments to 
advance U.S. interests.  
 
3.  To identify, address, and counter any legal actions that impede the U.S. pursuit of its 
national interests. 
 
4. To coordinate with other agencies within the U.S. government to develop lawfare 
options that work in conjunction with other government initiatives in the pursuit of 
U.S. national interests.  
 
Analysis 
This U.S. lawfare doctrine will provide the foundation necessary to conduct 
offensive and defensive lawfare operations against future adversaries. While general in 
nature, the lawfare doctrine outlines the essential duties and responsibilities of the 
proposed lawfare program. When combined with an internal and external oversight 
system, the lawfare doctrine has the necessary strategic framework and direction to create 
lawfare policy options to meet its specified mission and strategic goals.  
Based on the relatively low cost of conducting lawfare campaigns compared to 
military action, it is likely that more states will be looking to use lawfare to advance their 
respective national interests. Presently, the U.S. has the tools to be a world leader in the 
use of lawfare; a position that it can use to further its national interests or disrupt the 
lawfare operations of adversarial states. China has been the only state actor to develop 
and use an institutional lawfare doctrine and is likely to be a leader in the field of lawfare 
for the near future. Other states, like Israel and Palestine, have adopted informal lawfare 
policies, opting to conduct lawfare campaigns without the rigid structure of a lawfare 
doctrine. 
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As one of the main targets of Chinese lawfare operations, the U.S. is facing a 
decision point. The U.S. has four options to respond to Chinese lawfare operations:  
1. The U.S. can ignore China’s continued lawfare operations. 
 
2. The U.S. can address China’s lawfare operations on a case-by-case basis using 
lawfare. 
 
3. The U.S. can develop a lawfare doctrine to counter China’s lawfare operations. 
 
4. The U.S. can create an offensive lawfare strategy to mitigate China’s lawfare 
strategies. 
 
While it is true that the U.S. can decide to ignore PRC lawfare operations directed 
at the US, it is likely that doing so will have negative repercussions on future U.S. efforts. 
Given the increased use of lawfare by state and non-state actors in the 21st Century, it is 
imperative that the U.S. at least consider developing defensive lawfare strategies to 
counter the lawfare operations of other states. By implementing a lawfare doctrine, the 
U.S. can develop future defensive countermeasures for a relatively low cost.  
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